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This paper studies the impact of new HIV therapies (HAART) on HIV testing and risky sexual 
behavior.  I use data collected in San Francisco among a high-risk population from 1994 to 2002.  
The evidence supports the hypothesis of a causal link between the introduction of HAART in 
late 1996 and the sharp increase in risky sexual behavior that ensued.  Further, following 
HAART, testers take more risks while non-testers take fewer risks.  The proportion of testers 
remains stable, which was ambiguous a priori, and HAART does not alter the composition of the 
testing and non-testing groups. 
   1
I.  Introduction 
 
  The HIV virus has caused worldwide devastation.  At least 60 million people have been 
infected, 90% of them living in developing countries.  It is believed that over 20 million people 
have died of AIDS (WHO, 2005).  The emergence of Highly Active Anti-Retro-Viral Therapy 
(HAART) in late 1996 has been one of the most radical steps in the treatment of AIDS.   
  Expanding access to treatments forms a key strategy of the international community to fight 
AIDS: the stated objective of the WHO is to have at least 3 million HIV-positive patients treated 
by 2006 worldwide.  It is urgent to consider the behavioral impacts of those drugs in order to 
understand their consequences on the spread of the disease.  In particular, by inducing “treatment 
optimism,” they may change the fear of contracting HIV and the incentives for testing for HIV.   
  The paper presents an empirical analysis of the effects of HAART on testing, unprotected 
sex, and number of sexual partners.  Better treatments reduce the price of risky sex, yet their 
effects are complex to interpret.  First, holding prevalence constant, one can think of the direct, 
first-order effect of HAART introduction.  Empirically, it should translate into an increase in 
risky sexual behavior.  This is my first testable hypothesis.   
  Second, I identify a corresponding equilibrium effect.  As treatment quality improves, HIV 
prevalence is expected to rise: this stems from the higher level of risk, together with an increase 
in the proportion of healthier HIV+ individuals present in the market for risky exposures.   
Everything else being equal, the optimal number of risky exposures decreases with the 
prevalence of the disease.  Yet the net effect of prevalence on the risk level
1 is negative only if 
risk taking is sufficiently prevalence elastic.  Otherwise, an increase in prevalence may induce 
                                                 
1 The risk level depends on both the amount of risky exposures and the prevalence of the disease. 
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some individuals to shift from safer sex and no testing to test and riskier behavior.  In turn, the 
expected increase in prevalence should increase the incentive to test for agents with a high “taste 
for risky sex” and should decrease the incentive to test for those with a low “taste for risky sex”.  
Consequently I predict that testers will take relatively more risks than non-testers following the 
introduction of HAART, which constitutes a second testable hypothesis.   
  Furthermore, with heterogeneity in preferences for risky sex, better treatments may result in a 
polarization of behaviors: with people who test engaging in more risky sex while those who do 
not test actually engaging in less risky sex.  This conjecture is my third testable hypothesis.   
  To validate these insights, I exploit a large data set of men who have sex with men (MSM) 
collected in San Francisco from 1994 to 2002.  The data reveal a sharp increase in overall risky 
sexual behavior starting exactly in 1997.  I use a difference method to purge the causal effect of 
HAART from other potential confounding factors: as expected, Whites and gays (as opposed to 
bisexuals) respond to HAART more strongly than others.  In addition, testers do take relatively 
more risks than non-testers (as measured by their likelihood to practice unsafe sex).  In fact, non-
testers take fewer risks altogether (as measured by their average number of partners).  I 
implement the first bivariate application of the Anderson (2004) polarization test to confirm this 
result non-parametrically.  Finally, I find that the proportion of testers remains stable, which was 
ambiguous a priori, and further that the average characteristics of the testing and non-testing 
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II. Literature Review and Motivation 
 
A.  Background 
  The parameters of the HIV infection changed in 1996 when the 11
th International Conference 
on AIDS announced major therapeutic improvements in HIV treatment.  Subsequent advances 
made undergoing HAART less excruciating by reducing the number of pills to be taken and side 
effects experienced.  HAART has reduced AIDS-related death rates by more than 80% for HIV+ 
people taking these drugs (CASCADE, 2003; Duggan and Evans, 2005).  Furthermore, by 
reducing the viral load to infinitesimal (yet, still, strictly positive) proportions, HAART 
decreases the rate of transmission of the disease (per coital act), conditional on unprotected 
sexual intercourse (Quinn et al., 2000; Gray et al., 2001).   
  Shortly after 1996, surveys documented an increase in unsafe sex in countries where HAART 
had been introduced.  Reported cases of STDs other than HIV confirm the pattern.  In the U.S., 
the incidence of gonorrhea increased by 9% between 1997 and 1999.  Prior to that upturn, it was 
declining at a rate of roughly 10% per year between 1986 and 1996 (Fox et al., 2001).  Although 
1998-2001 marked a spike in the incidence of gonorrhea, it is now decreasing much more slowly 
than in previous decades.  Similar trend breaks have been found in Canada, (Health Canada, 
2000), in Europe (Eurosurveillance, 2002) and in Australia (Grulich, 2000).   
  The public health and epidemiology literature has suspected for a few years that the belief in 
the efficacy of HAART increases risky sexual behavior (Crepaz, Hart and Marks, 2004), but it 
has failed to link the change in incentives with the issue of testing.  In addition, some of these 
studies rely on questioning individuals directly about their views on HAART; hence they waver 
between a causal path from optimism to risk and optimism about treatments as a form of post   4
hoc rationalization following risky encounters (Huebner, Rebchook and Kegeles, 2004).  In any 
event, observing an increase in risky sexual behavior after 1996 is not enough to isolate a causal 
effect from HAART since the observation could, theoretically, be driven by other reasons, 
notably time effects, e.g., the so-called “prevention fatigue”, a generational effect, the decreasing 
impact of prevention campaigns, or any combination of such reasons.   
  At the same time, more effective treatments could be expected to increase the demand for 
testing.  In the pre-HAART era, one could excuse non-testers as potentially rational, albeit 
selfish individuals.  Limited therapeutic options meant the lead time gained by knowing one’s 
status did virtually nothing to lengthen life, and simply extended the time spent worrying about 
dying.  Yet, the impact of new treatments on the incidence of testing seems, if anything, modest 
(see for example the Report on HIV/AIDS in Ontario, 2003).  This apparent puzzle has been 
neglected. 
This paper examines the impact of HIV treatments from the perspective of economic 
epidemiology (Philipson, 2000; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003).  It extends the literature in 
economics estimating the impact of HIV testing or public health interventions — such as 
subsidies for safe sex or information campaigns — on sexual behavior (Philipson and Posner, 
1994 and 1995; Geoffard and Philipson, 1996; Boozer and Philipson, 2000).  More specifically, 
it seeks to expand upon an analysis developed in Geoffard and Mechoulan (2004): according to 
that paper, under the existence of HAART, susceptible individuals who undergo testing are 
expected to increase risky exposures.  On the other hand, the paper argued that those who do not 
test do not face a change in their incentives.  Consistent with these arguments, Geoffard and 
Mechoulan (2004) found a significant increase in risky sex among testers and no significant 
increase among non-testers.   5
  This previous investigation left several issues unresolved.  A problem with that model is that 
it does not explain why some people undergo testing while others do not.  It simply implies that 
those who do test will take more risks after the introduction of HAART.  Geoffard and 
Mechoulan (2004) used the relative stability of the proportion of testers as an implicit argument 
for treating non-testing individuals as a control group.  The identification of HAART thus hinged 
on a questionable foundation.  Moreover, the stability in the proportion of testers is a rather 
counter intuitive pattern and deserves some elaboration.  In particular, it stands at odds with the 
sharp increase in unprotected sex observed after 1996 (among those who test).  In this paper, I 
therefore improve on that previous work by acknowledging the endogeneity of the testing 
decision and suggest new arguments to account for the empirical stability of testing.  Also, I 
propose a second-best method to support the causal effect of HAART availability beyond its 
identification against a flexible time trend.  Finally, Geoffard and Mechoulan (2004) ignored the 
variability of the number of partners as a key alternative measure of sexual risk.  I now analyze 
two margins of risk, i.e., both protection and number of partners. 
  Another closely related paper is that by Goldman, Lakdawalla and Sood (2004) which 
analyzes risky sexual behavior among HIV+ individuals using access to health insurance as an 
instrument for treatment status.  They find that treatment results in more sexual risk-taking by 
HIV+ adults.  Insofar as my population is mostly composed of HIV- individuals, this work can 
be thought as a complement to theirs.  Further, since they focus on HIV+ people, the dimension 
of the testing decision is missing in their analysis and their data allows them to consider number 
of partners as the only risk variable.   
  I qualify their conclusion on two points.  First, Goldman, Lakdawalla and Sood (2004) 
interpret a reduction in (observed) prevalence following HAART as increased precautionary   6
behavior by the uninfected.  Yet, such an observation would be equally plausibly consistent with 
a flow of new high risk testers who previously practiced safer sex with no testing and are 
therefore, at first, for the large majority of them, HIV-.  So while I agree that it is possible that 
“reductions in prevalence might suggest worse welfare outcomes, not better ones,” I stress that 
the measurement of HIV prevalence itself is endogenous.  Second, the conclusion that because 
HIV+ individuals take more risks they increase the spread of the disease seems premature.   
Beyond changes in number of partners by the HIV+, the spread of HIV stems from the type of 
sex chosen, the behaviors of susceptibles and the diminished risk of HIV transmission when HIV 
patients are under HAART (Blower, Gershengorn and Grant, 2000). 
 
B.  Hypotheses 
  The arguments underlying my conjectures build on the literature that addresses the 
interaction between primary and secondary prevention.  See Kenkel (2000) and Eeckhoudt et al. 
(2001) for details.   
  Susceptible individuals choose a level of risky exposure to HIV and decide whether they 
should get tested or not.  Testing is costly but gives access to a better outcome should one test 
positive.  The optimal level of risk is determined by the tradeoff between the perceived benefits 
of risky sex (relative to safer sex) and the expected cost to be infected, which depends on one’s 
number of risky sexual exposures, the overall prevalence rate (taken as given), and the 
availability of treatment.  One of the fundamental results of economic epidemiology is that the 
optimal number of risky exposures decreases with the prevalence of the disease.  However, for a 
given number of exposures, an increase in prevalence also directly increases the risk level.  The 
net effect of a higher prevalence on the risk level is negative only if the demand for risky   7
exposures is sufficiently prevalence-elastic.  Conversely, if that demand is not elastic enough, an 
increase in prevalence may convince some individuals to shift from safer sex and no testing to 
testing and risky behavior: for these individuals, the utility loss from further reducing their 
sexual activity would be too large and outweigh the benefit of risk avoidance.  Safer sex and 
testing are thus alternate ways to lower the risk level, either by reducing the probability of 
infection, or by reducing its consequences.   
  Then, how does one disentangle the effects of better treatments?  The analysis of the first, 
direct effect assumes a constant prevalence.  There should be an increase in the risk level among 
individuals for whom testing is already optimal.  Indeed, for those who test regularly, improved 
treatments unambiguously reduce the cost of getting the disease.  Moreover, the release of new 
treatments may spur so-called “treatment optimism” whereby individuals are overconfident 
about the effectiveness of such new treatments and their subsequent improvements (Auld, 2003).  
Second, there should be a selection effect, i.e., individuals at the margin who switch to testing 
and increase their risk level.
2  These individuals would substitute one risk reduction strategy 
(reducing the number of risky exposures) for another (reducing the consequences of infection).  
Third, the effect of new treatment availability on risk taking for the non-testers should be non-
negative, based on their option value of testing.  Empirically, the direct and presumably first-
order effect should then result in an increase in risky sexual behavior and intentions to practice 
unsafe sex following the introduction of HAART.  Formally, defining Risk = f(HAART 
availability, Prevalence, Individual characteristics),  this translates as:  
Hypothesis (1): f1> 0    (1) 
                                                 
2 These direct and indirect demand effects are analyzed formally in Geoffard (2004). 
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  Simultaneously, I envision a corresponding equilibrium effect.  Note that as treatment quality 
improves, HIV prevalence should increase.  First, as explained earlier, susceptibles should take 
more risks.  Second, the new drugs extend the lives and improve the quality of life of HIV+ 
individuals, which implies an increase in the proportion of those present in the market for risky 
exposures.  The susceptibles should in turn become relatively more cautious, and this would act 
as a counteracting force against riskier behavior.
3   Because at the margin an increase in 
prevalence increases the incentive to test for agents with a high “taste for risk” (those with 
relatively inelastic demand for risky sex) and decreases the incentive to test for those with a low 
“taste for risk”, I predict that testers will take more risks than non-testers following the 
introduction of HAART.  Formally, defining [Risk | Test] = g(HAART availability, Prevalence, 
Individual characteristics | Test) and [Risk | No Test] = h(HAART availability, Prevalence, 
Individual characteristics | No Test), this translates as: 
Hypothesis (2): g1 > h1   (2) 
  In the limit, with enough heterogeneity in preferences for risky sex, better treatments may 
result in a polarization of behaviors whereby individuals who test would engage in a higher 
amount of risky sex, while those who do not test would actually engage in less risky sex.  Notice 
this possibility goes against the (naïve) view that no behavioral change should occur among 
individuals who choose not to test, the argument being that they should be indifferent to 
treatment opportunities.  Whether that is the case or not, these people are not indifferent to the 
expected prevalence change induced by HAART.  Formally, this translates as:  
                                                 
3 This offsetting indirect effect, however, is expected to be second-order.  An analogy would be the standard end 
product of a decrease in the wage on the competitive equilibrium of workers hired: as the wage falls, the demand for 
labor increases but the price of output falls as well, which results in less of an increase in labor than would have 
been the case had output price remained constant.     9
Hypothesis (3): g1 > 0 and h1< 0    (3) 
with the provision that risk may be measured in different ways (both protection and number of 
partners) to establish those hypotheses. 
  A central assumption underlying Hypotheses (2) and (3) is that the option value of treatments 
when non-testing is significantly lower than the value of treatments under testing.  Obviously, 
only testing opens access to treatment conditional on being HIV+.  Yet, why would the cost of 
getting the disease become lower for testers given that, if contamination happened tomorrow, 
there would typically be no physiological benefit from knowing this for several years?  A high-
risk selfish individual may thus be tempted to wait for AIDS symptoms, get tested, and then fully 
benefit from treatments.  Things are not that simple: after infection, there is no gain from HIV 
testing per se but there is a gain from regular (every 3-6 month) CD4 count testing so that the 
start of HAART can be optimally timed.  Therefore, waiting for diarrhea and wasting or even 
later for an opportunistic infection probably entails a loss of expected life years.
4  It is difficult to 
fathom that many non-testers would adopt such a risky strategy, let alone that they would (or 
could) get a regular blood test for CD4 monitoring only but not for HIV.  More importantly, the 
preceding discussion reflects the state of our medical knowledge in 2006: in the mid to late 
1990s, when physicians did not know (or neglected) HIV drug resistance, treatments began much 
earlier than today (the “hit early, hit hard” strategy, officially abandoned in 2000).  Finally, the 
reasons that some individuals have not yet performed a test (stigma, optimism, delusion, etc.) 
indicate that they are also less likely to get tested in the future absent symptoms, and therefore 
                                                 
4 HAART seems to offer the best clinical response when it is started at CD4 counts at just under 350.  Those who 
wait until CD4 falls below 200, never seem to regain the full function of their immune system.  Within the next few 
years epidemiologists will have collected enough cohort data to estimate the percentage reduction in survival 
entailed by the decision by an asymptomatic patient to delay HIV testing until symptom onset.   10
less likely to fully benefit from HAART.  These factors therefore support Hypothesis (2) and 
Hypothesis (3).   
  These three hypotheses may be regarded as variations on the classical seatbelt argument, 
whereupon drivers wearing seat belts feel more secure, and drive less carefully, leading to more 
traffic accidents (see Peltzman, 1975).  Here, susceptible individuals solve the joint problem of 
optimizing testing decision and risk levels, and adjust that risk level along two margins (number 
of partners and protected sex) instead of just one as in the driving case.  Note that I limit my 
analysis to behavioral changes among susceptibles.  The overall impact of treatments on HIV 
prevalence (the analog of traffic fatalities) is even more complex to assess and would require 
richer data.   
  Further, HIV prevalence among those who do not test is, by definition, unobserved.  Instead, 
what is observed is the prevalence among those who get tested (i.e., the proportion of positive 
tests).  Recall that new treatments may lead some previously low risk individuals to test.  The 
risk level of these individuals, who are presumably at the margin, would be lower than the 
average risk level among the whole population of testers, which may be simultaneously deprived 
of some of its lowest-risk members.  Therefore, changes in the observed proportion of positive 
tests may provide a downwardly biased estimate of changes in actual risky behavior.  In fact, 
even if the proportion of positive tests decreases empirically, actual risky behavior may have 
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III. Data  
 
A.  Sources 
  My data come from the Stop Aids Project (SAP).  This San Francisco-based agency has 
gathered information on populations at risk for HIV since 1994.  Precisely, the SAP data set is 
made of non-repeated cross sections and targets MSM.   
  The sampling frame is as follows.  The SAP volunteers randomly intercept people on the 
streets of gay districts and participants of a variety of gay-oriented venues (i.e., bars, clubs, 
events, parades, street fairs) in the course of outreach education.  Those people then answer a 
detailed questionnaire.  Data are collected throughout the year and each interview has a record of 
the exact time when it was made.
5   
  My collection runs from April 1994 to June 2002.  Since it goes back as far as 1994 before 
the introduction of HAART, it is essential in identifying treatment effects on behavior.
6  The 
number of individual records ranges from 9,942 in 1997 to 2,657 in 2001.  Overall, the data base 
contains answers from 48,888 interviews.  Some people may have been sampled more than once 
and if so, it is indicated. 
  The data are rich with questions pertaining to sexual practices in the six months prior to the 
interview: number of partners, type of intercourse, whether a condom was always used, etc.  On 
                                                 
5 Note that since these are not longitudinal data, I cannot track the same individuals over time; accordingly I can 
only observe changes in the composition of the testing and non-testing group through their average characteristics.   
 
6 Such information, with a large sample size on a high risk population, and collected consistently over such a period, 
is exceptional.  The data have been used in the public health literature over the past several years and their validity is 
well documented. 
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the other hand, the questionnaire is relatively poor with socio-demographic variables.  Only age, 
ethnicity, and zip code are available throughout.  That is why I merged the SAP data with the 
STBF3 file of the U.S. Census to obtain information on median education and income in the SAP 
respondents’ zip codes.
7 
  A key problem is that the question regarding HIV status was not introduced until the middle 
of 1997.  Thus, I cannot compare the behaviors of HIV+ persons before and after the advent of 
the new treatments although it is plausible that behavioral adjustments to therapeutic 
improvements differ by serological status.  Epidemiological studies contend that this is not the 
case (Crepaz, Hart and Marks, 2004).
8  What I can observe in the SAP data set after June 1997 
supports that assertion.  HIV+ respondents, although more likely to practice unsafe sex in 
absolute terms (44% vs. 32% on average), do not do so relatively more than HIV- individuals 
over time (+1.2% vs. +1.6% per year on average).  The data on number of partners reveal a 
similar pattern: HIV+ respondents have a higher number of partners (14.7 vs. 9 on average) yet 
increase their average number of partners at a slower rate: +0.6% vs. +2.4% per year on average.  
“Only” 14% of individuals interviewed after June 1997 who got tested declare they are HIV+, 
and the proportion is 13% out of all interviewees.  This proportion is stable over 1997-2002.  The 
population is therefore fairly homogenous with respect to HIV status.
9   
                                                 
7 Because the Census does not cover all zip codes, some individuals do not have observations on median household 
income or education in their zip code.   
 
8 Theoretically, this may be justified by the fact that “superinfection” (reinfection by a second strain of virus), or 
secondary infections (such as syphilis), are possible and may lead to disease progression. 
 
9 However, this may not necessary reflect the true HIV prevalence in the MSM community of the San Francisco area 
which was been estimated to be closer to 20% in the late 1990s (Catania et al., 2001).   13
  The benchmark empirical estimations ignore this corruption problem.  Still, to check whether 
it is serious, I perform a two-step sensitivity analysis.  First, I simply remove those individuals 
who are known to be HIV+ from mid-1997 on.  In this case, among the testers, I have a mix of 
HIV+/HIV- before July 1997 and HIV- individuals exclusively afterwards.  Assuming the same 
proportion of HIV+ before July 1997, this leaves now 6% of unidentified, HIV+ respondents 
aware of their status in the sample.  Second, I impute the missing values on HIV status for 1994-
mid 1997 based on the exogenous characteristics of HIV+ that are almost always available 
throughout (age, age
2, whether White, whether resident of the Bay area, whether resident of 
California, median household income in zip code, median household education in zip code).
10  I 
thus construct a counterfactual sample of non-testers and susceptible testers by removing the 
14% known HIV+-testers from July 1997 on, and the 14% “most likely HIV+”-testers before 
July 1997, based on imputed HIV status. 
  As a final caveat, it is important to note that I restrict attention to sexual behavior.  I cannot 
analyze change in intravenous drug use risk, and therefore miss an important risk factor of HIV 
transmission.  Further, the data set only captures attitudes and behaviors of a subset of adults 
affected by HIV risk and infection, namely MSM.  Nevertheless, I believe that the new insights 
that can be collected from those data outweigh the limitations of the design. 
 
B.  Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample with definitions of all the variables.  
The main variables are defined as follows.  d_after is the dummy variable corresponding to the 
introduction of HAART: d_after =1 starting from 1997, 0 otherwise. d_test is a dummy 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10 I have also checked that these predictors of seropositivity do not change over time.   14
indicating whether the individual declares “knowing his serological status” (before February 
1997) or “performed an HIV test” (after January 1997).
11  The consistency of the answers before 
and after the change of formulation, which can be checked on a daily basis, has convinced me 
that I am in fact dealing with the same question, which defines who belongs to the “test group.”  
A large majority of the respondents are testers.  It is critical to understand that almost all non-
testers have never performed an HIV test: in other words, they do not declare non-testing 
because they already know that they are HIV+ and are therefore in absorbing state.  From the 
question on sero-status result introduced in 1997, I checked that 98% of non-testers declare not 
knowing their status, whereas 98% of testers declare knowing it, 14% of them declaring being 
HIV+.
12    Therefore, the corruption of the sample for the testers (where the HIV+ are 
undistinguishable from the HIV- in the first three years of the survey) does not apply for the non-
testers.   
  Those variables measuring sexual activity in the six months prior to the interview are 
numbers (number of partners)
13, d_analsex (at least one case of anal intercourse, henceforth AI), 
d_analcond (at least one case where no condom was used), and d_vaginalsex (at least one case of 
vaginal sex).  I use d_vaginalsex as a proxy for sexual orientation (i.e., bisexual vs. gay).   
                                                 
11  A question regarding how much time elapsed since the most recent test was introduced in 1997: 73% of 
respondents who answer yes to “Have you had an HIV test?” did have a test less than a year before the interview. 
 
12  The variable d_result presented in Table 1 is a binary recode from an original question with three possible 
answers: “HIV+”, “HIV-“, and “Do not know”.   
 
13 The variable numbers (number of partners) is censored at 999 but highly promiscuous respondents make only a 
tiny fraction of the sample: 0.63% declares a number of partners greater than 100 over six months.   15
Finally, the question “Do you intend to practice safe sex?” was dropped after January 1997 but 
resumed in the second half of 2000.   
  Regrettably, the formulation of the questionnaire does not allow to know the frequency of 
risk taking among those who declare not always using protection, let alone the nature of the risk 
taken for each of the sexual encounters; which is why my empirical analysis deals with a more 
conservative (if not more robust) indicator.  I recombined variables d_analsex and d_analcond 
into a variable indicating whether the individual declares exposing himself to some AI risk in the 
last sixth months.  Therefore my main variable of interest is risk on the intensive margin: d_UAI.  
This dummy takes value one if the individual declares any unprotected AI in the last six months.  
Considering the extensive margin of risk, the number of partners does not mean only the number 
of male partners with AI, i.e., the riskiest kind of sex.  It is therefore an imperfect measure of 
risk.  Yet it turns out that, not surprisingly, the higher the number of partners, the higher the 
chance that the respondent declares some UAI. 
  It is also useful to consider a synthetic indicator of risk that combines intensive and extensive 
margins.  I construct d_Syn = d_{Numbers<2}×(1-d_UAI), where d_{Numbers<2} is an 
indicator for whether the individual declares fewer than two partners in the last six months.  In 
other words, d_Syn = 1 if the individual takes no risks on either margin, 0 otherwise. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A.  Data Patterns 
  The following diagrams illustrate some of the most interesting features conveyed by the raw 
data.  Graph 1 summarizes the evolution of the main variables.  The most striking patterns are   16
the increase in UAI over the period (see Page-Shafer et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2002), together 
with the increase in the proportion of individuals who do not intend to practice safe sex.  These 
two features of the graph provide strong support for Hypothesis (1).
14  At the same time, testing 
odds remain fairly constant at a high level (88 to 93%).  Recall that I only have the first semester 
of 2002.  On top of seasonality issues (on average, I find that individuals take more risks in the 
second semester), the sample size is smaller than in previous years so any break observed that 
year — for this graph and the following ones — should be interpreted with caution.  

























not intend to practice
safe sex
 
  I start with the analysis of risk taking along the two dimensions of number of partners and 
UAI.  I first compare the evolution of the number of partners for those who test and those who do 
not.  Graph 2 illustrates a key element: the difference in number of partners between those who 
                                                 
14 I also uncovered that the perception of risk from peers increases sharply between mid 1994-1996 and January 
1997, after which data collection on this topic stops.  This further supports Hypothesis (1).   
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test and those who do not test increases sharply after 1996.
  The feature supports at least 
Hypothesis (2) and to a lesser extent Hypothesis (3).   














  When looking at the proportion of UAI by testing category (Graph 3), I note that from 1997 
on, the difference in the probability of UAI increases discretely between testers and non-testers.  
This significant and dramatic increase in UAI, specifically after 1996 among those who test, 
further supports Hypothesis (2).  On the other hand, the proportion of UAI among those who do 
not test increases as well, but almost linearly, and to a smaller extent.
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  As for the proportion of testers, most noticeably I have just shown that it increases overall 
only in the last two years of the survey.
15  Note that the difference in the proportions of testers 
between the two groups UAI=0 and UAI=1 which was decreasing between 1994 and 1996 
widens significantly afterwards (Graph 4).  However, one should bear in mind the scale used: the 
changes in the proportion of testers are small.   
                                                 
15 This discontinuity is puzzling.  However, I note that a similar increase in the proportion of testers is observed in 
Ontario in those two years (Report on HIV/AIDS in Ontario 2003) and is unexplained by the principal investigator 
responsible for the data collection.  A sharp increase has been signaled in France as well after 2000. 
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  The proportion of testers by number of partners (Graph 5) reveals a more spectacular pattern.  
Among those with more than three partners (heuristically the most revealing cutoff when I 
characterize the behavior of high-risk individuals, but other presentations would confirm the 
pattern as well) the proportion of testers increases strikingly after 1996 when an important 
reversal occurs: from then on, testing is significantly more frequent in the multi-partner group 
than among its complement.  This feature indirectly supports Hypothesis (3). 
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  Regarding intentions (Graphs 6), one can also see a dramatic change in 1997 (from the 
observation of January alone).  Looking at the mid-2000 to mid-2002 data, the decreased 
intentions to practice safe sex are consistent with the actual decrease in safe sex over the period.  
Note that the decrease in intention to practice safe sex appears much more pronounced among 
those who declare testing.  This is another argument in support of Hypotheses (1) and (2). 















Those patterns are the motivation for the econometric analysis that follows.   
 
B.  Econometric Analysis 
  Before testing my three hypotheses, I first verify whether HAART significantly influences 
the testing decision.  The demand for testing stems for individuals with a sufficiently large 
probability to be infected.  Given a certain risk level, there is a critical value of treatment quality 
such that testing is optimal if and only if the quality of treatment is greater than that quality 
cutoff.  The introduction of HAART should then lead to an increase in testing.  However, 
because changes in prevalence affect both risk taking and the incentives to test, a possible 
offsetting effect of treatments is, as mentioned earlier, the more risk-averse fraction of the   21
population decreasing its risk level and therefore its incentives to test.  This could occur if the 
increase in prevalence sufficiently reduces the level of risk, so that testing is no longer worth its 
costs.  
  My empirical check is whether I detect a break in the overall proportion of testers controlling 
for a linear-quadratic time trend and socio-demographic characteristics.   
2 Pr( _ 1) ( _ _ ) ii
i
d test d after Time Time Individual Characteristics αβ γ δ λ == Φ+ + + + ∑  (4) 
It has been shown earlier that testing is relatively stable over the 1994-2000 period: it seems to 
increase over 1994-96, to decrease over 1997-2000 and increase again after 2000.  The different 
specifications presented in Table 2 confirm this initial view.  Table 2 tells us that the coefficient 
of d_after, if anything, is actually negative and always non-significant.
16   
  A closer look at the stable proportion of testers following the introduction of HAART reveals 
that it is driven down by those with no UAI, which was already expected from Graph 4.  This 
pattern is consistent with the proposition of complementarities between risk and testing.  What is 
more puzzling is the non-significance of d_after when regressing d_test over the sub sample 
where d_UAI=1 exclusively:  I expect risk takers to be more likely to test if it becomes more 
valuable.  A possible explanation is that so many of them are testers in the first place.  According 
to the preceding discussion, another explanation for the stability of testing after 1996 would be 
that the prevalence effect offsets the direct incentive to get tested. 
                                                 
16 The coefficients reported here and for all other Probit regressions, are the discrete probability changes dΦ /dx 
computed at the means of the data, where Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of N(0,1).  For each coefficient, 
the t-test reported is that of the underlying Probit coefficient being zero.   
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  However, I do not observe a significant increase in prevalence in the sample from the time 
this information becomes available on.  Further, the same way the fraction of positive tests does 
not increase, what I may call practical prevalence — the probability of meeting an HIV+ partner 
up for risky sex at random — likely does not increase either: recall that, if anything, the risk 
level, measured by UAI and number of partners, increases faster among those who test negative 
from mid 1997 on.  Hence the need for alternative hypotheses explaining why we do not see a 
significant increase in testing following HAART.  For example, testing may allow people to 
obtain unprotected sex with a higher probability and partners may have become less strict or 
demanding.  The less deadly the disease is, the less the need to show a negative test as proof of 
lower risk.  Finally, biased perceptions of prevalence may have overestimated the true risk level. 
  The finding that the proportion of testers is approximately stable led Geoffard and 
Mechoulan (2004) to conveniently consider the non-testing group as a control group.  Table 3 
presents an analysis of d_UAI within the testing and non-testing groups where I estimate the 
following model:  
2 Pr( _ 1) ( _ _ ) ii
i
d UAI d after Time Time Individual Characteristics αβ γ δ λ == Φ+ + + + ∑  (5) 
  The first two columns refine and confirm the key result in Geoffard and Mechoulan (2004) 
while offering a counterpart to Graph 3.  Column (3) runs the same Probit on the subsample of 
testers, with observable HIV+ removed (from July 1997 on).  Column (4) does the same on the 
counterfactual subsample of susceptible testers based on the removal of observable HIV+ and of 
the unobservable, most likely HIV+ given the imputation method described earlier.  It is 
comforting to see that estimates from columns (2), (3) and (4) are not statistically different from 
each other and significantly different from zero.  This offers a reasonable indication that the 
contamination problem is not too serious.  To summarize, the increase in UAI occurs within the   23
testing group (as expected) but not in the non-testing group (where all I can say is that the effect 
should be smaller).  This finding constitutes a validation of Hypothesis (2).  Yet, if Table 2 is to 
present conclusive evidence of the causal impact of HAART on behavior in the entire population 
– Hypothesis (1) – the exercise is not entirely convincing because testing is in principle 
endogenous. 
  The main identification challenge is the possibility that, despite a flexible time trend, the 
before/after treatments dummy variable may pick not only the new treatments but other elements 
that change over precisely that same period.
17  Such a concern, however, can be reasonably 
qualified.  A flexible time trend buys considerable identification power in this context because 
the usual factors of sexual risk among MSM are known to show a high level of persistence.  The 
public health literature teaches us that high-risk behavior among MSM is most commonly 
associated with the expression of sexual identity and sexual addiction, “sensation-seeking” 
personality traits, depression (hence desire to escape from the reality of HIV), recreational drug 
consumption (such as methamphetamine or nitrite inhalants, i.e., “poppers”), sero-sorting, or 
safer sex / prevention fatigue.  It follows that, on average, the determinants of sexual activity 
among MSM vary slowly over time.  Consequently, a flexible time trend should capture most of 
the secular changes in risk-taking.  It is especially important here because the increase in risk 
predates the introduction of HAART.  If the significance of a break in the data “survives” the 
                                                 
17 To my knowledge, the only other element that meets those criteria and may have affected sexual behavior is a 
significant expansion of the Californian AIS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) — itself a consequence of HAART.  
Therefore, my main indicator captures not only the discovery of new treatments but possibly also their availability 
through extended insurance coverage, which does not affect the main argument of the analysis. 
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inclusion of such controls, it should intuitively correspond to a major change, such as the 
announcement that the cause of AIDS is sexually transmittable.   
   This being said, I cannot exploit the same variations in treatment access as in Goldman, 
Lakdawalla and Sood (2004).  However, it is intuitive that certain groups of individuals should 
respond to treatment availability more strongly than others.  First, an abundant public health 
literature documents that Whites have better access to treatments, and are more likely to seek 
treatments and to receive better care than Blacks and Hispanics in the U.S.
18   The medical 
literature further reveals that, for genetic reasons, Blacks are less responsive to HAART.
19  
Consequently, among Black and Hispanic men, the death rate from AIDS is significantly greater 
than for Whites.  The behavioral response of Whites should therefore be stronger than that of 
non-Whites.  Similarly, “pure” homosexuals or gays, by definition, do not substitute sexual 
activity toward women, whereas other MSM — roughly speaking opportunistic homosexuals or 
bisexuals — may do so (see Posner, 1992).
20  I thus form the hypothesis that gay men will be 
taking relatively more UAI risk following HAART compared to bisexuals.  Recall I do know 
throughout if a respondent has had sex with a woman in the last six months.  In the data, I 
therefore expect those who do not have sex with women to respond more strongly to HAART 
than those who do.  The proportion of respondents who have sex with women is stable at 9% 
                                                 
18 See for example Gebo et al. (2005), Moore et al. (1994), Kass et al. (1999), Kahn et al. (2002), Morin et al. 
(2002), Villarosa (2004), Lopez-Quintero et al. (2005), Campo et al. (2005).  I have also uncovered some evidence 
that Asian gays are sexually less risk taking than Whites (Van de Ven, Mao and Prestage, 2004).   
 
19 See for example http://www.thebody.com/tpan/novdec_05/afam_health.html (Malebranche, 2005) 
 
20 Francis (2005) explores this substitution effect empirically in the context of the appearance of HIV in the 1980s.   
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before and after 1996 which supports the idea that sex with women is exogenous with respect to 
HAART.
21   
  I first checked that simple uncontrolled difference in differences pre-1997/post 1996 between 
Whites and other groups, and between those who recently had sex with a woman and those who 
had not, support my hypotheses.  I then defined two difference estimators: d_caucasian × d_after, 
and d_vaginalsex × d_after.  The idea behind the interaction term d_caucasian × d_after, for 
example, is to capture the differential impact of being White after 1996 — controlling for being 
White, the before/after 1996 effect, other individual characteristics (Bay area resident, age etc.), 
and a flexible time trend.  The same idea applies for the interaction term: d_vaginalsex × d_after. 
Yet, this is not a standard difference-in-differences exercise: Whites are not a perfect control 
group for non-Whites; those who recently had sex with a woman are not a perfect control group 
for those who had not, even though being White or having sex with women does not 
significantly influence the probability of UAI in the pre-HAART era.  Rather, I am evaluating 
treatment intensities in groups for which differences that may affect UAI need be controlled for.  
To best cope with this problem, I obviously control for the before/after 1996 effect, individual 
characteristics and a flexible time trend, but also add all these controls interacted with the race 
and sexual orientation variables.  To take again the first source of variation, the interpretation of 
the interaction term coefficient d_caucasian × d_after becomes then the pure differential effect of 
HAART between Whites and non-Whites.  The coefficient of the variable d_after becomes 
mechanically what it is when the sample is restricted to the non-White group only.  Note the 
particular importance of adding the variables d_caucasian × Time and d_caucasian × Time
2: 
                                                 
21 The result is confirmed when regressing d_vaginalsex on the other exogenous variables: the coefficients of d_after 
and of the linear-quadratic time trend are non-significant individually and jointly.   
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these interaction terms capture the secular differential impact of being White over the whole time 
frame and enable me to purge the estimate I am focusing on from any smooth trend in 
differential effects.   
  I provide those estimates in Table 4a and 4b in the form of linear probability models.
22  For 
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where ε   is    normally  distributed.       (6) 
Estimates from Table 4a and 4b support Hypothesis (1).  In both cases, column (1) presents 
the benchmark estimation with no interaction term, and column (2) adds the main interaction 
term only.  Recall that the identification of the preferred model relies on the assumption that 
differences in unobservables between the different groups can be ignored.
23   At least, when 
adding different interaction terms using the observables in columns (3) and (4), the coefficients 
are statistically significant and not different from the coefficient in column (2), which suggests 
that unobserved heterogeneity may not be harmful in this case.  As in the previous Table, models 
(5) and (6) address the problematic presence of HIV+ testers.  Estimates from columns (4), (5) 
and (6) are not statistically different from each other and significant, which constitutes yet 
                                                 
22 See Ai and Norton (2003) who discuss problems with interaction terms in nonlinear models. 
 
23 See Meyer (1995) for a comprehensive discussion. However, note that even if d_Caucasian × d_after picked a 
confounding factor such as the differential effect of being wealthy after 1996 (despite the control for median zip 
code income), it would merely change the interpretation of the result, not the result itself.  Indeed, I expect wealthier 
people to receive better medical care.  So at the margin, if they can expect more benefits from HAART, they should 
take more risks.   27
another indication that the main results are robust to the contamination problem.  Thus the 
weight of the cumulative evidence, from two distinct sources of variations, supports Hypothesis 
(1), namely a causal impact of HAART on risk, as measured here by UAI.   
  I then move the investigation to the least intuitive conjecture, Hypothesis (3), e.g., the 
possibility of a polarization of risky behavior between testers and non-testers.  While I have 
established that testers take more risks, I cannot assert that non-testers take fewer risks when 
looking at the UAI dimension alone.  Still, I follow up on this idea with the study of number of 
partners by test group which I previewed in Graph 2.   
  Table 5 presents an analysis of Numbers and d_Syn within the testing and non-testing groups 
where I estimate the following models: 
2 __ ii
i
Numbers d after Time Time Individual Characteristics α βγ δ λ ε =+ + + + + ∑  
where ε   is    normally  distributed.       (7) 
2 Pr( _ 1) ( _ _ ) ii
i
d Syn d after Time Time Individual Characteristics αβ γ δ λ == Φ+ + + + ∑  (8) 
The estimates in Table 5 confirm a decrease in the number of partners among non-testers.  No 
significant effect is found among testers.  Models (1)-(4) analyze changes in number of partners 
while models (5)-(8) analyze the composite indicator of risk d_Syn.  Models (1) and (5) support 
the idea that non-testers adopt safer attitudes following HAART.
24  From models (2)-(4), I can 
safely rule out the possibility that those who test have increased their number of partners because 
of the large proportion of testers before and after 1996, leaving little room for composition 
                                                 
24 I obtained qualitatively similar results when analyzing the dependent variables “whether four or more partners”, 
“whether fewer than two partners,” “number of partners conditional on that number being greater than one,” etc.  
Note that these results are driven by the White respondents.   
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changes within that group: since there are 88-90% of testers initially and the proportion of testers 
remains stable (except for a slight change in 2001-2), at the very most I only have 11-13% of 
new members in the test group after 1996 and I would need an equal number of former testers 
becoming non-testers, which is unlikely, as will be argued shortly.  In contrast, the interpretation 
of behavior changes among non-testers is more difficult than among testers.  The composition of 
the non testing group could be, in principle, vastly different before and after 1996. 
  In fact, one could interpret the results in Table 5 in three different and non-exclusive ways, 
which would be equally consistent with the observation of a larger proportion of testers among 
those with multiple partners as well as a larger proportion of non-testers among those with few or 
zero partners (Graph 5).  The interpretations are the following: (1) those who did not test and had 
many partners have moved to the test group; or (2) those who tested and had few or zero partners 
have moved to the no-test group; or (3) those who do not test decrease their number of partners.   
  It appears least plausible that the first and second effects forming a double movement, in 
opposite directions, are leaving the proportion of testers almost intact while replacing a large 
portion of the population of non-testers by former testers.  In fact, I find some characteristics of 
the no-test group, before and after 1996, that differ from the test group.  For example, the 
proportion of men who have sex with women is 13% in the no-test group before and after 1996, 
it is 8% before and after 1996 in the test group.  The proportion of California residents is 70% 
before and after 1996 in the no-test group; it is 78% in the test group before 1996, and 80% 
afterwards.  The proportion of San Francisco residents is 60% before 1996, in the no-test group, 
and 62% afterwards; it is 68% in the test group before 1996 and 70% afterwards (and in both 
cases the testers have lived in San Francisco for a longer period of time).  Respondents in the no-
test group are younger in both periods — by two years before 1996, and by four years   29
afterwards.  Respondents in the no-test group are less educated, by less than a month before 
1996, and by less than three months afterwards.  They are also less likely to be White — by 4% 
before 1996, and by 8% afterwards.
25   The cumulative evidence points toward viewing the 
composition of the populations of testers and non-testers as roughly stable throughout the period.  
Consequently, the most satisfying interpretation is the third one.  In other words, Table 5 
(combined with Table 3)  does support Hypothesis (3).  Again, even if prevalence does not 
increase, the perceptions of a higher risk level may have convinced the non-testers to decrease 
their exposures.   
  The argument of polarization is also consistent with the evolution of the variance in the 
number of partners (Graph 8): from an average (and quasi-constant) standard deviation of 21 in 
1994-96, it moves to an average standard deviation of 28 in 1997-2002.  Between 1996 and 1997 
alone, the increase is from 22 to 28, that is, +27%.   
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  Finally, I propose a bi-dimensional application of the non parametric polarization test created 
by Anderson (Anderson, 2004).  In this context, the Alienation Index is 1 – {proportion of 
overlap of the tester-non-tester frequency distributions}.  The result indicates that the joint 
                                                 
25 Comparisons of median Household Incomes are inconclusive. 
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distribution of number of partners and UAI in the test and no-test group has significantly less 
overlap in 1997-2002 than in 1994-1996 (at the 1% level), confirming the parametric analysis.
26  
  In summary, the no-test group becomes more conservative and the test group more risk 
inclined.  This polarization result does not appear to stem from selection effects between the two 
groups; it supports the theory of complementarities between test and risk.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
  Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapies have vastly improved the quality and length of life 
of people infected with HIV.  However, by lowering the cost of the disease and inducing 
“treatment optimism,” they may have changed incentives for risky sexual behavior and testing.  
In this paper, I develop and empirically test a simple rational model of individual behavior where 
susceptible agents decide whether to get tested and whether to take risks. 
  Using a unique data set that collects information on sexual behavior and testing in a high risk 
population between 1994 and 2002 I first substantiate the prediction of a global increase in risk 
following improved treatments in late 1996 through two distinct difference estimators.  I show 
that those who get tested take relatively more risks than those who do not.  Further, because of 
heterogeneity in preferences for risky sex, a polarization of behaviors emerges: people who have 
a high taste for risky sex being more likely to test and to take more risks, while those with a low 
taste for risky sex being less likely to test and to take fewer risks.  However, I could not predict 
that testers and non testers use different margins to control their risk level: empirically, in 
response to the new treatments (and relative to a flexible time trend), testers increase their risk 
                                                 
26 Program code and results available from the author.  
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through UAI while non-testers decrease their number of partners.  I performed an Anderson 
(2004) polarization test to confirm this result non-parametrically.  The composition of the two 
groups seems unchanged over time. 
  These findings may be linked with Kremer and Morcom’s (1998) conclusion that HIV may 
spread faster if those who take few risks take even fewer risks because they are least likely to 
contaminate others.  In particular, Kremer (1996) shows, without reference to therapeutic 
improvements, that a high prevalence, “fatalistic” steady-state equilibrium with polarization of 
behaviors between low-activity and high-activity individuals is a noticeable possibility.  In the 
light of my empirical results, it is plausible that HAART fostered a new separating equilibrium in 
the San Francisco MSM community in the late 1990s between testers and non testers. 
  Yet, in view of the limited evidence on the evolution of HIV prevalence in the data, and 
given the little change in the composition of the testing and non-testing groups, this high-risk 
equilibrium does not seem to have translated into a high-prevalence equilibrium.  To be sure, 
given the data at hand, I do not know with certainty if HIV+ individuals have decreased their risk 
level between the pre- and post- HAART periods.  However, given the similarity in the positive 
trend in sexual risk between positives and negatives after 1996, this hypothesis is unlikely.  The 
most plausible explanation is that the HAART-induced reduction in infectiousness has offset the 
global increase in the risk level.  This could explain the paradox of non-testers reducing their risk 
level and the proportion of testers remaining roughly the same even if (practical) prevalence does 
not increase: at the time, few knew about the reduction in infectiousness, while the dramatic 
health benefits of HAART were for everyone to see.  In this context, it is therefore not surprising 
to detect a precautionary behavior by non-testers.   32
  The previous remarks stress the need to understand better the epidemiological response to 
therapeutic improvements.  If the unintended consequence of better treatments is to increase the 
spread of the epidemic, as suggested by Katz et al. (2002) and Goldman, Lakdawalla and Sood 
(2004), the answer may be as a shift of R&D resources towards effective vaccine rather than 
treatments, or increased prevention programs.  Alternatively, if HAART has slowed or better yet, 
reversed the spread of HIV, it would be desirable to take steps to improve access to those 
treatments in the developing world (Over et al., 2004).  Finally, Philipson, Mechoulan and Jena 
(2006) show that the direct and external welfare benefits obtained through HAART dominate the 
cost of the R&D investment that led to it.  This suggests that if HAART is prevalence neutral, 
which remains to be established, its positive welfare effects are unambiguous. 
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Table 1: Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variables       # Obs    Mean    Std.   Dev  Min  Max 
 
Dependent  Variables        
 
d_test     39,884   0.904   -   0  1 
(=1 if Ever tested in last 6 months)   
d_uai     48,888   0.257   -   0  1 
(=1 if Ever practiced UAI in last 6 months) 
numbers    48,060   8.414   25.13   0  999 
(Number of partners in last six months) 
d_intentions    22,161   0.93   -   0  1 
(=1 if Intention to practice safe sex) 
d_vaginalsex    48,189   0.092   -   0  1 
(=1 if Sex with a woman in the last six months) 
 
 
Independent  Variables       
 
Age     48,598   33.478   9.334   15  99 
zipcode   44,210   -   -   00600  99941 
Sanfran   26,439   8   9.6   0  81 
(How long have you lived in San Francisco?)   
d_answ   48,112   0.264   -   0  1 
(=1 if answered a STOP AIDS questionnaire before)   
Time     48,888   0.396   -   0  1 
(Time trend) 
d_caucas    48,888   0.666   -   0  1 
(= 1 if White) 
d_doneit    39,677   0.179   -   0  1 
(=1 if ever attended a STOP AIDS meeting)  
d_after     48,888   0.57   -   0  1 
(= 1 after 1996, 0 before 1997) 
d_bay     48,880   0.693   -   0  1 
(= 1 if resident of San Francisco Bay Area) 
d_cal     48,880   0.791   -   0  1 
(= 1 if resident of California) 
med_edu    42,368   15,837   1.589   9  20 
(Median education in Zip Code) 
med_HHI    42,352   34,450   10,898   4,999  129,654 
(Median Houshold Income in Zip Code) 
d_result    19,512   0.14   -   0  1 
(=1 if HIV+, July 1997 onward; sample of testers)   38
TABLE 2: PROBIT REGRESSION WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE: d_TEST 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) 
  
d_after    -0.009 -0.002 0.002  -0.006 -0.013    -0.004 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.009) 
 
Pseudo R
2    0.002 0.051 0.054 0.052    0.045   0.026 
 
#  observations    39,884 33,755 28,634 33,755 31,310    28,892 
 
 
Samples control for: Time, Time
2, Age, Age
2, d_caucasian, d_bay, d_cal, d_answ, Median Household Income, Median Household 
Education 
 
Model (1) controls for Time, Time
2 
 
Model (2) controls for Time, Time
2 Age, Age
2, d_bay, d_cal, d_caucasian, d_answ, Med_Edu, Med_HHI 
 
Model (3) controls for Time, Time
2, Age, Age
2, d_bay, d_cal, d_caucasian, d_answ, Med_Edu, Med_HHI, d_doneit 
 
Model (4): same as Model (2) with d_after=1 from October 1996 on 
 
Model (5): same as Model (2) without known HIV+ testers (identifiable from July 1997 on) 
 
Model (6): same as Model (5) without most likely HIV+ testers based on imputed HIV status (before July 1997).  See text for details. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   39
TABLE 3: PROBIT REGRESSIONS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE: d_UAI 
              
              
    non-testers  testers 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)             
                     
d_after        0.016  0.08  0.058  0.055            
       (0.035)  (0.01)
*** (0.012)
*** (0.013)
***       
 
Pseudo R
2          0.011 0.034 0.03   0.027 
Adjusted R
2                  
 
#  observations        2,951 30,804    28,359  25,941       
 
 
All samples control for: Time, Time
2, Age, Age




Sample for models (1): non-testers 
 
Samples for models (2)-(4) : testers 
 
Samples (3): known HIV+ testers (14% of the testers) are removed from the sample of testers (from July 1997 on) 
 
Samples (4): counterfactual sample of “susceptible testers only”, same as Models (3) with 14% of most likely HIV+ testers removed 
(before July 1997) based imputed HIV status.  See text for details. 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
***: 1% significance level; 
**: 5% significance level; 
*: 10% significance level. 
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Table 4a: Linear Probability Models for Difference Estimates 
Dependent Variable: d_UAI 
 
    (1) (2) (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
 
d_caucasian  ×  d_after       0.037    0.038   0.036  0.042  0.03 
         (0.009)
*** (0.017)





d_after      0.034    0.01    0.008    0.01  -0.002  0.002 
   (0.008)
***   (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.015) 
 
R
2  0.03      0.03  0.03    0.031 0.026 0.024 
 
#  observations    41,635    41,635    41,635     41,635  39,174   36,756 
 
 
All regressions contain controls for: Time, Time
2, Age, Age
2, d_caucasian, d_bay, d_cal, d_answ, Median Household Income, Median 
Household Education 
 
Model (3) contains controls for: d_caucasian × Time, d_caucasian × Time
2  
 
Model (4) contains controls for: d_caucasian × d_answ, d_caucasian × age, d_caucasian × age
2, d_caucasian × d_bay, d_caucasian × 
d_cal, d_caucasian × median education, d_caucasian × Time, d_caucasian × Time
2 †  
 
Model (5): same as Model (4) without known HIV+ testers (identifiable from July 1997 on)
† 
 
Model (6): same as Model (5) without most likely HIV+ testers based on imputed HIV status (before July 1997).
†  See text for details. 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***: 1% significance level; 
**: 5% significance level; 
*: 10% significance level. 
 
† Adding d_vaginalsex, d_vaginalsex × d_caucasian does not affect results   41
Table 4b: Linear Probability Models for Difference Estimates 
Dependent Variable: d_UAI 
 
    (1) (2) (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
 
d_vaginalsex × d_after        -0.054       -0.097    -0.095  -0.088  -0.086 
      (0.015)





d_after     0.037    0.042      0.046   0.046 0.036 0.032 
   (0.008)
***  (0.008)







2  0.031    0.031    0.031   0.032 0.028 0.025 
 
# observations    41,077     41,077    41,077      41,077  38,653  36,263 
 
 
All regressions contain controls for: Time, Time
2, Age, Age
2, d_caucasian, d_bay, d_cal, d_answ, d_vaginalsex, Median Household 
Income, Median Household Education 
 
Model (3) contains controls for: d_vaginalsex × Time, d_vaginalsex × Time
2.  
 
Model (4) contains controls for: d_vaginalsex × d_answ, d_vaginalsex × age, d_vaginalsex × age
2, d_vaginalsex × d_bay, 
d_vaginalsex × d_cal, d_vaginalsex × d_caucasian, d_vaginalsex × Time, d_vaginalsex × Time
2, 
 
Model (5): same as Model (4) without known HIV+ testers (identifiable from July 1997 on) 
 
Model (6): same as Model (5) without most likely HIV+ testers based on imputed HIV status (before July 1997).  See text for details. 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***: 1% significance level; 
**: 5% significance level; 
*: 10% significance level. 
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TABLE 5: OLS AND PROBIT REGRESSIONS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  
 
     Numbers        d_Syn  =  d_{Numbers<2}×(1-d_UAI) 
 
  Non-testers   testers      Non-testers        testers 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     OLS             Probit       
d_after  -4.82    0.769    -0.194      -0.327 0.092  -0.011 -0.001 0.008 
 (1.57)
*** (0.69)    (0.7)    (0.732)    (0.04)
**  (0.012) (0.12)  (0.013) 
 
Pseudo R
2                       0.016 0.018 0.017 0.016 
R
2  0.022    0.008    0.007    0.008       
 
#  observations 2,905    30,432     28,027     25,643      2,905  30,432  28,027  25,643 
 
 
All regressions contain controls for: Time, Time
2, Age, Age
2, d_caucasian, d_bay, d_cal, d_answ, Median Household Income, Median 
Household Education 
 
Samples for models (1) and (5): non-testers 
Samples for models (2)-(4) and (6)-(8): testers 
 
Models (3) and (7): same as Models (2) and (6) without known HIV+ testers (identifiable from July 1997 on) 
 
Models (4) and (8): same as Models (3) and (7) without most likely HIV+ testers based on imputed HIV status (before July 1997).  
See text for details. 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***: 1% significance level; 
**: 5% significance level; 
*: 10% significance level. 
 